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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Despite calls for its obsolesce, the lending channel of the monetary transmission mechanism contin-
ues to generate interest among monetary economists. Recently, Den Haan, Sumner and Yamashiro
(2007) ﬁnd the loan-supply eﬀect is evident for consumer lending and real estate loans in data up
through 2004. The loan-supply eﬀect, or lending channel, arises in the transmission mechanism if
tight monetary policy forces banks to contract the supply of loans independent of a direct interest
rate-eﬀect (i.e., the “liquidity eﬀect”), and such a contraction has real eﬀects for bank-dependent
borrowers. While some, such as Perez (1998) and Ashcraft (2006), have emphasized the lending
channel’s lack of relevance for the monetary transmission mechanism, Den Haan, Sumner and Ya-
mashiro’s (2007) results support a number of recent papers that oﬀer detailed and disaggregated
reasons why the channel is alive and well for certain lenders and borrowers. Kashyap and Stein
(2000), for example, identify the lending channel through the lending of small banks relative to large
banks, emphasizing a key implication of the lending channel literature–that the lending channel
operates through small lenders and small borrowers (Gertler and Gilchrist (1993, 1994) emphasized
t h er o l eo fs m a l lﬁrms in the channel; for recent studies see Nilsen (2004), Peek, Rosengren, and
Tootell (2003), Kashyap and Stein (1995), and Kishan and Opiela (2000)). Den Haan, Sumner
and Yamashiro’s (2007) ﬁndings suggest that the role of the consumer in the lending channel–a
small borrower historically thought to be dependent on small banks–may be deserving of more
attention.1
This papers asks whether consumer lending is, or has become, a signiﬁcant component of the
lending channel (even if it was not thought crucial in lending channel studies published in the 1990s).
Speciﬁcally, I take a closer look at the statistical and possible economic signiﬁcance of the consumer
loan-supply eﬀect with disaggregated monthly consumer credit data from both commercial bank
and non-bank sources, and for the nonrevolving and revolving components of consumer credit from
each source. In addition, I examine disaggregated quarterly consumer loan data from commercial
banks, for all banks and separately for both large and small banks (as deﬁned in the manner of
1Kashyap and Stein (2000)). From this array of data, spanning 1968 through early 2007, I can
consider statistically the key assumptions of the lending channel with respect to consumer lending,
and then from that evidence, consider the possible economic signiﬁcance of the channel.
To examine the consumer lending channel statistically, I use a well-established strategy in the
lending channel literature to test the assumptions of the channel on all fronts–that households
may be forced to use more expensive non-bank credit as bank credit declines, that a household
might switch into more costly revolving credit as installment loans decline, or that households are
particularly aﬀected by an attachment to small banks. To do so, I ﬁrst estimate monthly vector
autoregressions (VARs) for the disaggregated consumer loan components mentioned above, with
the monthly data spanning 1968 to 2006.2 In this way, I follow the examples of numerous lending
channel studies in two crucial respects. First, I examine disaggregated data to discern evidence of
the loan-supply eﬀect.3 And second, I follow the lending channel literature in assuming short run
restrictions to identify the structural VAR and estimate the associated impulse response functions.
This close adherence to the VAR tradition with the short-run restrictions is meant to compare as
closely as possible the results of this paper to the rich body of lending channel literature.4 For
robustness, this paper also employs Jordà’s (2005) linear projection technique, the latter of which
provides conditional standard errors to aid in the statistical inference of impulse response functions
(see also Jordà (2007), and further discussion in section 3).
In addition, I estimate with quarterly data on installment (nonrevolving) consumer loans and
disaggregated data on credit card lines, which includes both credit card balances and data on the
“unused portion of credit card lines,” which represent the pre-commitments that commercial banks
have to credit card lines. This data set, obtained from the Call Reports collected by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), provides multiple beneﬁts. First, assessing the quarterly
data along side the monthly data provides for more robust inference in identifying the lending
channel. This follows explicitly the example of Den Haan, Sumner and Yamashiro (2007).5 And
second, I draw from credit card research to motivate the short-run restrictions used in identifying
the structural VAR with the quarterly data set (Gross and Souleles (2002), and Castranova and
2Hagstrom (2004) are examples of studies on credit card lines). Given the structural assumptions,
one can then control for the unused supply of credit card lines in inferring the statistical and
economic signiﬁcance of the loan-supply eﬀect. And ﬁnally, with the quarterly panel data I
am able to separate large-bank consumer lending from small-bank consumer lending since 1972
(delineated by asset percentile, as in Kashyap and Stein (1995)). Complete details of the monthly
and quarterly applications, including various checks for the robustness of the speciﬁcations, are
provided in section 3.
In preview of the results, ultimately the consumer credit data analyzed in this paper suggest
both the statistical (and by extension, the economic) signiﬁcance of the consumer loan-supply eﬀect
is weak; in the least, the eﬀect has weakened over time. While monthly consumer credit data from
commercial banks from 1968 through 2006 substantiates previous research on consumer lending–
matching the decline documented by Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Den Haan, Sumner and
Yamashiro (2007)–after 1984 the responses of both nonrevolving and revolving consumer credit is
not consistent with the lending channel. Instead, both series increase, similar to the result found
by Den Haan, Sumner and Yamashiro (2007) for commercial lending (in fact, total nonrevolving
and revolving consumer credit increase for two years after the monetary shock). Also after 1984,
the data does not support the notion that households are forced to rely on credit cards in lieu
of access to installment loans, or rely on non-bank sources of credit in lieu of bank credit. The
quarterly data help corroborate the inference on the monthly data. Notably, while before 1984 the
loan-supply eﬀect is evident for consumer lending from small banks and not large banks (consistent
with Kashyap and Stein (2000)), this eﬀect does not appear after 1984. Instead, small bank
consumer lending increases for up to two years after the shock along with a slight increase for large
bank consumer lending (consistent with the impulses noted for the monthly data for all banks).
Overall, the results of this paper have implications for the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy. While combined recent studies on small banks and consumer lending identify a consumer
loan-supply eﬀect over the last four decades, this paper notes the statistical signiﬁcance of this
eﬀect has diminished in the last twenty years. Indeed the statistical evidence casts doubt on
3the economic signiﬁcance of the consumer lending channel. While the economic signiﬁcance of
the lending channel has long been uncertain (if not very weak, as noted by Perez (1998), Ashcraft
(2006) and others), developments in consumer lending over the last three decades (and the growth of
credit card lending, in particular) may suggest to some that the relevance of a consumer loan-supply
eﬀect is greater than was considered in the literature only a decade ago. Recent data and empirical
studies support a key assumption of the lending channel, that consumers are liquidity-constrained in
credit markets, and may have become increasingly constrained over time.6 The statistical evidence
in this paper, however, suggests monetary policy has little real eﬀect on consumers through the
lending channel.
In particular, the impulse response functions cited in this paper suggest households are not
reliant on one type of lender or type of credit, implying households are not constrained in credit
markets, at least not in the aggregate. Instead, the data are consistent with the notion that the
expansion of consumer credit markets has alleviated liquidity-constraints for households. If so,
households can smooth consumption in the face of policy or economic shocks in general. For
monetary policy, this should temper the propagation of monetary shocks, or at least, render less
eﬀective eﬀorts by monetary policy to stimulate aggregate demand. The lack of evidence supporting
the lending channel for post-1984 data support that possibility.
On two related notes, the analysis on consumer credit data in this paper also calls into question
the eﬀectiveness of short run ﬁscal policy (see Coronado et al. (2005), and Johnson et al. (2006),
for analysis of recent ﬁscal stimuli), and speaks to the discussion on the “Great Moderation” of the
macroeconomy documented by McConnell and Perez-Quiros (1999) and others.7 While many are
quick to associate the moderation with the steady hand of the Federal Reserve, the developments
in consumer credit markets, and the data on consumer credit examined here, suggest structural
forces are certainly part of the story. In the least, more liquid consumer credit markets, and the
associated lack of a consumer lending channel, imply that accommodative aggregate demand policy
has less control over short run conditions.
The particulars of these implications are taken up below. The next section outlines ﬁrst the
4general ﬁndings of lending channel literature and its relevancy for households. The latter half of
the section then provides descriptive data on consumer credit that suggest the assumptions of the
lending channel no longer ﬁt for households. Thereafter, the empirical analysis is presented in
detail.
2 The Lending Channel and Consumer Credit
In the lending channel of the transmission mechanism, contractionary monetary policy can force
constrained commercial banks (constrained on both sides of their balance sheet) to restrict lending
independent of the demand for loans (see Bernanke and Gertler (1995) for a detailed survey). For
borrowers dependent on commercial banks, contractionary monetary policy restricts their main
source of credit and increases the costs of seeking alternative sources (see Kashyap and Stein (1995),
and Gertler and Gilchrist (1993, 1994) for detailed discussions). As such, the most compelling
literature on lending eﬀects focuses on the relationship between small banks and small borrowers.
Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000), and Gertler and Gilchrist (1993, 1994) provide a combination of
empirical evidence showing that small commercial banks do contract lending after a negative policy
shock (while larger banks do not), and small ﬁrms are aﬀected by that contraction (see also Kishan
and Opiela (2000)). The “small” commercial bank assumption is important, since it is assumed
the small borrower relies on a special relationship with the small bank for its credit, and ﬁnds it
diﬃcult to get credit from larger banks, or from non-bank alternatives.
For households, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that consumer loans decline signiﬁcantly
following a monetary policy shock, while Ludvigson (1998) ﬁnds evidence of a loan-supply eﬀect
through auto loans. With updated data, Den Haan, Sumner and Yamashiro (2007) ﬁnd similar
results for consumer loans (they ﬁnd no such lending eﬀect for commercial and industrial loans).
These lending channel studies corroborate the assumptions of the lending channel hypothesis that
small, liquidity-constrained borrowers suﬀer when monetary policy forces banks to contract lending.
Indeed, the support for the importance of liquidity constraints motivating a consumer loan-supply
5eﬀect is well-documented in the consumption literature. As mentioned above, recently, Gross and
Souleles (2002) suggest credit card borrowing is indicative of the continued relevance of liquidity
constraints. At the same time, households have been traditionally dependent on small, local banks
for ﬁnance (see Berger et al. (1995)). Den Haan, Sumner and Yamashiro’s (2007) result, in
particular, suggests that consumer lending may be a last viable component of lending channel (as
other studies, including Den Haan et al. (2007) have found little to weak evidence for a lending
channel for ﬁrms–see Ashcraft (2006) and Nilsen (2002), and Peek, Rosengren and Tootell (2003),
the latter of which is more supportive of a loan-supply eﬀect for ﬁrms).
However, as compelling as the imagery of the liquidity-constrained household may be in invigo-
rating lending channel enthusiasts, the lending channel through consumer lending may have dimin-
ished over time. Various strands of economic research suggest that factors such as deregulation,
commercial bank consolidation, and other aspects of structural change in ﬁnancial markets have
increased consumer lending to all households (see Athreya (2002)). One implication is that con-
sumer lending from commercial banks has increased overall and is now predominately the province
of large, national banks. Credit card lending, for example, requires the economies of scale best
handled by a large organization (Peek and Rosengren (1998)). In the least, a glance at consumer
credit data suggest the motivating assumptions behind the lending channel do not hold.
2.1 Some descriptive consumer credit data
First, consumer credit data suggest households are not dependent on small commercial banks as
the lending channel tradition assumes (or perhaps never were to the extent assumed), nor do
households want for non-bank sources of credit (see Peek and Rosengren (1998) for discussion on
the ﬁrst point). With respect to the former, the top ﬁve percent of all commercial banks (in total
assets) are now primarily responsible for consumer lending, especially credit card lending. By the
end of 2002, banks above the 95th percentile in total assets accounted for 90 percent of consumer
lending from commercial banks, and 97 percent of credit card lending. Twenty years prior, the
same group of banks accounted for approximately 60 percent and 93 percent, respectively (with
6the latter category growing from approximately 23 billion dollars to 300 billion dollars).8
Moreover, from all lenders, revolving consumer credit (credit card lending) has increased from
25 billion dollars in 1971 to 770 billion dollars by the end of 2006.9 That represents an increase in
the revolving component as a share of total consumer credit of 5 percent to 36 percent, respectively.
Figure 1 displays these increases relative to installment bank loans (for total banks, and for large
and small banks) along with comparative series for non-bank installment and revolving loans.10
The increase in credit card lending is dominated by banks, while non-banks have increased their
share of installment loans relative to banks.11 One will also note the decline in installment lending
by small banks and the relative increases of both loan categories for large banks.12
Figure 1
The growth of credit card lending, in particular, suggests the lending channel may be weaker.
Unlike installment consumer loans, a credit card holder has the option of using the unused portion
of their credit card line immediately. This liquidity option is not ﬁxed but may increase even
as balances increase. As discussed by Gross and Souleles (2002) extensions of credit card limits
are typically based on duration since the card was issued, increasing at predetermined intervals
or set by other institutional rules. Hence, credit card liquidity may remain well after a negative
income shock has occurred (even if the bank eventually curtails its oﬀers of additional cards or
lowers existing limits). Therefore, even in the face of tighter monetary policy, credit cards oﬀer
households immediate liquidity in the current period and potential liquidity in future periods. This
implies that even in the face of tighter monetary policy, households may be able to access the loan
before lenders can or will lower the limit. In other words, the constraint only binds once the
available liquidity is exhausted. In the lending channel, this would occur if lenders lower the limit
to the level of the existing balances, which may or may not occur immediately or at all. This
would depend on the lenders likelihood of lowering the limit in the aggregate and to a level where
the constraint binds.13
7Indeed, the amount of available liquidity on credit cards dwarfs the level of balances–as
measured on and oﬀ bank balance sheets.14 For example, for the second quarter of 2007 the
amount of the unused portion of credit card loans in the aggregate was just over three trillion
dollars (constant 2000 dollars), while combined on and oﬀ-sheet balances totaled just over seven
billion 2000 dollars for the same quarter. This utilization rate of just over twenty percent is
consistent since approximately 2000. Figure 2 displays the unused portions of credit card lines and
the real balances of credit cards as reported in the Call Reports and collected by the FDIC since
1990. More noteworthy than the growth of credit card balances is the available liquidity.
Figure 2
Based on the smattering of descriptive evidence discussed thus far, it would seem that in the
aggregate households are not liquidity-constrained.15 In other words, the consumer credit data
suggest that the lending channel for consumers may have been aﬀected by the expansion of consumer
lending. With this in mind, in the next section, I document the consumer lending channel using
VAR techniques.
3 Testing for the Consumer Lending Channel
To consider the consumer credit data more formally, I search for evidence of the loan-supply eﬀect
by comparing disaggregated bank and non-bank loan data, at both the monthly and quarterly
frequency (though the non-bank data are only at the monthly frequency). This follows the general
strategies of Gertler and Gilchrist (1993, 1994), Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000), Ashcraft (2006),
and Den Haan, Sumner and Yamashiro (2007). I examine disaggregated consumer credit across
bank and non-bank sources, and across the nonrevolving and revolving components of each, and
for small and large banks (by assets). In addition, I then compare and contrast the behavior of the
disaggregated components across time. Comparing disaggregated loan categories tests the lending
channel in the following ways:
81. Ceteris paribus, if a bank contracts its supply of installment loans, the revolving component
may still increase as consumers rely on those loans to oﬀset the traditional lending channel
eﬀect. In this way, the lending channel may have real eﬀe c t sa sh o u s e h o l d st y p i c a l l yp a y
more for revolving credit than installment credit.
2. Ceteris paribus, if a bank contracts its supply of either nonrevolving or revolving loans, non-
bank loans may increase. This, too, suggests an increase in costs for households which may
aﬀect real spending.
3. If non-bank sources of credit are more wide-spread than in the past, or households simply are
not dependent on small banks as suggested in section 2, then the lending channel may have
less economic (and statistical) signiﬁcance than in the past.
3.1 The VAR and Sample Selection
I estimate a VAR that includes monthly real consumption expenditures, real nonrevolving consumer
credit, real revolving consumer credit, the personal consumption expenditure deﬂator, and the fed-
eral funds rate.16 Real consumption and the consumer loan components are in log-levels (multiplied
by 100), while the deﬂator and the federal funds rate are in their natural units. All data where
relevant are seasonally adjusted and in 2000 constant dollars. The speciﬁcation is standard in that
I include a variable capturing real activity, a price index, a variable representing monetary policy
and either aggregate or disaggregate credit variables.17 Variants on that general speciﬁcation can
be found in what is now a rich monetary literature employing VAR analysis, including Bernanke
and Blinder (1992), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993, 1994), Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993), Lud-
vigson (1998), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999), and recently, Den Haan, Sumner and
Yamashiro (2007), and Ashcraft (2006). As detailed in Christiano, et al. (1999) this combination
of literature (as well as the more recent papers) provide a consistent picture of how both real and
ﬁnancial variables respond to monetary policy.
Given the nature of the monthly consumer credit data, the estimated VAR must be modiﬁed
9by sample (note the quarterly data alluded to earlier, which allows for the bank size comparison,
will be discussed later). Hence the samples are selected as follows:
• Commercial bank credit is estimated from 1968 through 2006. Though nonrevolving con-
sumer bank credit begins in 1959, revolving bank credit begins in 1968. Hence I restrict the
estimation beginning in 1968.18
• Non-bank credit is estimated over the period 1984 through 2006. Nonrevolving non-bank
credit, though it begins in 1959, contains a jump in the mid-1970s. And revolving non-bank
credit does not begin until December 1984. Hence, the non-bank category is restricted by
the latest date. Note, too, that when comparing non-bank to bank credit, the comparison
occurs for the 1984 through 2006 period.
• Finally, to compare the behavior of the commercial bank loans across time, I compare the
period 1968 through 1983 to 1984 through 2006.
The separation of the sample in 1984 is motivated by a number of factors (in addition to facil-
itating the comparison with the non-bank loans). First, with respect to consumer credit markets,
this break serves to delineate the deregulated consumer credit environment from the earlier period
(see the discussion in section 2). In addition, recent research has shown that the macroeconomy
overall has been less volatile since the middle of the 1980’s than before (see McConnell and Perez-
Quiros (1999), and Ahmed, Levin and Wilson (2002)). Corroborating this research, Brady (2008)
ﬁnds statistical breaks in consumption and its components at various dates in the mid-1980s, and
breaks in total and revolving credit in both the mid-1980s and in the 1990s (see Brady (2008) for
more details and explanations of those breaks). As a generalization of the breaks found in this
research, I split the sample in this paper with the end of 1983 and the ﬁrst month of 1984. Lastly,
one can also interpret this break as signifying a pre-Greenspan era from the Greenspan era at the
Federal Reserve, which began in 1987.19
Lastly, short run restrictions are assumed in order to identify the structural VAR. In practice
10this is achieved by recursive identiﬁcation through a Cholesky decomposition with the variables
ordered as listed above. In making this assumption, I follow what has been a standard identiﬁcation
practice with VARs in the credit channel literature. Since the purpose of this paper is to consider
the implications of consumer credit within that tradition of evidence, I adhere closely to the practice
of that literature. A lag length for estimating each VAR is chosen by the corrected-AIC (which is a
modiﬁed version of the AIC–see Hurvich and Tsai (1989)). A lag length of four proved suﬃcient
for the general speciﬁcation (regardless of the particular loan categories included).20
Note that for robustness, I estimate impulse response functions by two related methods: the
ﬁrst with a standard VAR, and the second by the local projection method of Jordà (2005). Though
the two methods will prove to oﬀer similar estimates for the impulse response functions reported
below, the latter method allows one to report both unconditional and conditional standard error
bands for each impulse response function (where the former are from the estimation of the stan-
dard VAR). In particular, Jordà (2007) provides the insight that the typical standard error bands
(i.e., the ±1.96×standard error) reported along with impulse response functions may be mislead-
ing. These standard error bands assume that individual coeﬃcients that make up the impulse
response function are uncorrelated. In fact, as Jordà (2007) notes, the coeﬃcients have a natural
temporal ordering with the period t’s realization dependent on the realization of the function up to
that point. While reporting typical standard error bands–what are the unconditional standard
errors around each coeﬃcient at each horizon h–provides an approximation, such bands ignore the
conditional nature of the coeﬃcient estimates. In other words, the typical 95 percent conﬁdence
band may over-estimate the conﬁdence interval for the impulse response function. Hence, Jordà
(2007) provides conditional standard error bands which, given the temporal ordering of the impulse
response functions, are constructed from a Cholesky decomposition of the Newey-West corrected
variance-covariance matrix estimated for the impulse response coeﬃcients. These bands deﬁne the
region for ˆ βi, given the prior ˆ βj’s.21 In the interest of brevity I refer the reader to Jordà (2005)
and Jordà (2007) for details of the local projection method.
The ﬁgures that follow display the impulse response functions calculated from the linear pro-
11jection method along with the unconditional standard error bands, and the conditional standard
error bands, referred to from here on in as the conditional conﬁdence bands. The impulse response
functions calculated from the linear projections prove to match closely those calculated from the
standard VAR, hence, the discussion of the results focuses on the former.22
3.2 Results for monthly consumer credit
Figure 3a displays the responses of nonrevolving bank credit and revolving bank credit across the
sample. The ﬁrst panel displays the response for nonrevolving bank credit from 1968 through
2006, and for the split samples to a one-standard deviation shock to the Federal Funds rate. From
1968 through 2006, the nonrevolving component reaches a trough at about two years and remains
below zero for almost another two years. With the unconditional standard errors bands the series
is statistically signiﬁcant for up to thirty months, while the conditional conﬁdence bands suggest
statistical signiﬁcance up to 48 months. The response of nonrevolving consumer loans for this
period is consistent with the credit channel literature cited above, in particular, with the recent
ﬁnding by Den Haan, Sumner and Yamashiro (2007) for their sample from 1960 through 2003.23
Moreover, Figure 3b displays the results for the additional regressors. The impulse response
functions are similar to those found in the lending channel literature. Consumption declines in
response to the shock and the behavior of the price deﬂator is also consistent with the literature
for the entire sample (though the “price puzzle” disappears in the latter part of the sample).
The shorter time period, up through 1983, oﬀers a similar picture as the full sample, though
in the former the statistical signiﬁcance lasts for, at most, 29 months. However, this result does
not hold after 1983. The impulse response function for nonrevolving consumer loans after 1983
is positive for up to two years, with the conditional conﬁdence bands statistically signiﬁcant up to
that point as well (though the traditional standard error bands show weak statistical signiﬁcance).
Though this result stands in contrast to the earlier part of the sample, it is consistent with Den
Haan, Sumner and Yamashiro’s (2007) result for commercial and industrial loans (but not, of
course, their result for consumer loans), suggesting that consumer lending, too, is not consistent
12with the lending channel after 1983.24
Figure 3
The impulse response functions for the revolving component of bank consumer loans displayed
in the second row of Figure 3a matches the general behavior of the nonrevolving component for
the full sample. The decline in the series from 1968 through 2006 is statistically signiﬁcant for
at least 32 months, and as long as 52 months (for the traditional standard error bands and the
conditional conﬁdence bands, respectively). For the 1968 through 1983 sample, however, the
response is statistically signiﬁcant for approximately up to 11 months, though the loan category
increases for up to about six months and then series declines thereafter. This may suggest a
substitution occurring into the revolving component. This possibility disappears, however, over
the 1984 through 2006 time period. Similar to the nonrevolving component, the revolving series
increases for more than two years and is at least statistically signiﬁcant for about 15 months.
In conjunction, looking at these two consumer loan components oﬀers little support for the
lending channel after 1983. The diminished lending channel story is made more compelling by
considering non-bank sources of consumer credit for the 1984 to 2006 sample (again, analysis for
the non-bank components are restricted by the lack of data before 1984). Figure 4 displays
the responses for nonrevolving non-bank credit and revolving non-bank credit. Contrary to bank
nonrevolving credit over this period, the nonrevolving component declines immediately and reaches
a trough three years after the shock. However, similar to bank revolving credit, non-bank revolving
credit increases, and is statistically signiﬁc a n tf o ru pt oa p p r o x i m a t e l y1 8t o2 0m o n t h s . 25 Figure 4
also displays the two sources of credit aggregated, along with total consumer credit (which includes
all possible sources including credit unions, for example). The response of the combined bank
and nonbank data is essentially zero of up to two years, while the total series responds similarly.
Ultimately, the behavior of either series does not support the lending channel after 1983; there does
not appear to occur a substitution into non-bank ﬁnance.26
13Figure 4
3.2.1 Implications for the Lending Channel
With the picture(s) thus formed, we can summarize the implications for the bank lending channel:
1. Recall, if a bank contracts its supply of installment loans, the revolving component may still
increase as consumer rely on those loans to oﬀset the traditional lending channel eﬀect. Both
nonrevolving credit and revolving bank credit respond similarly across the sample period. In
the early sample, it is less likely households could easily oﬀset the decline in installment loans
with a credit card loan, so this result is not surprising. In the 1984 to 2006 sample, both
categories show a positive response. In the least, the contrast between the two split samples
shows very little support for the bank lending channel.
2. Recall, if a bank contracts its supply of either nonrevolving or revolving loans, non-bank loans
may increase. There is little evidence of such a substitution occurring. In fact, non-bank
installment loans show more of a decline than bank installment loans in the 1984 through
2006 sample. This would suggest that loan demand is behind the decline as opposed to a
supply eﬀect. And similar to the bank revolving loans, non-bank loans increase following the
shock.
3. If the changes in consumer credit discussed brieﬂyi ns e c t i o n2h a v ea ﬀected both how con-
sumers receive credit and use credit, the lending channel eﬀect will die out over time. This
seems evident in the split-sample comparison. This positive behavior for consumer lending
matches the response of commercial and industrial loans documented by Den Haan, Sumner
and Yamashiro (2007), consumer loans increase for up to a year in the latter sample.
The data for both bank and non-bank consumer loans suggest the lending channel operating
through consumer lending has weakened. While for the overall sample, the data match previous
14literature, if we compare the pre and post 1983 samples, the lending channel appears diminished.
This is consistent with recent literature on the “Great Moderation,” (see McConnell and Perez-
Quiros (1999), and Ramey and Vine (2005) for examples). In particular, the response of consumer
lending in the face of a monetary shock is consistent with consumption smoothing evidence docu-
mented in Brady (2008), and supports the argument of Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel (2006) that
developments in credit markets help explain the decline in macroeconomic volatility. Moreover,
this evidence for consumer lending is consistent with the ﬁndings of Perez (1998) and others that
ﬁnd the lending channel is not likely a signiﬁcant channel–statistically or economically–in the
transmission mechanism any longer.
3.3 Quarterly Consumer Lending and Credit Card Liquidity
For additional robustness, in the next two sub-sections I consider further the loan-supply eﬀect
by focusing on quarterly data on consumer lending. The quarterly data allows three additional
perspectives on the loan-supply eﬀect. First, this follows the example of Den Haan, Sumner and
Yamashiro (2007) in examining multiple data sets (both monthly and quarterly) in considering the
lending channel. Second, as part of that eﬀort, the quarterly data allow me to incorporate data on
aggregate credit card balances and data on the available liquidity from credit cards, together which
make up aggregate credit card lines. And third, the quarterly data allow me to compare consumer
lending from both large and small banks. This distinction, as noted in Section 2, is found to be
important in lending channel research.
The data are from the Call Reports of all insured commercial banks in the United States (made
available by the FDIC). This panel data set (aggregated for the estimation) includes, in addition
to consumer installment loans, credit card balances and the portion of credit card lines that have
yet to be used, deﬁned appropriately as the “unused portion of credit card lines.” This variable
may be useful to consider in the context of the lending channel since it captures the liquidity
option of credit cards and may help one distinguish between demand and supply in response to a
contractionary monetary policy shock.
15This is based on the simple conjecture that one can identify and infer a loan-supply eﬀect with
narrative evidence on the institutional rules governing credit card limits. As discussed brieﬂyi n
section 2, Gross and Souleles (2002) ﬁnd that limit changes are predominately based on institutional
rules and only a small portion of limit changes are from borrower request (and the latter is typically
associated with a request for an increase in the limit). In other words, any decline in the response
of the unused portions to a contractionary monetary policy shock likely represents a supply-side
eﬀect. Of course, one cannot completely rule out the possibility that borrowers request the decline
to avoid temptation or for some other reason.27 However, the narrative evidence suggests that
assuming limit changes are predominately at the behest of the lender is a reasonable structural
assumption. That is, this posits that the unused portion series is not aﬀected by a change in the
level of balances in the current period (in other words, in a VAR, the unused portions are ordered
ahead of the balances).
For this sub-section, I estimate a speciﬁcation with the quarterly data on consumer installment
loans (nonrevolving loans), credit card balances (revolving loans) and the unused portion of credit
card lines. Following the section 3, the speciﬁcation also includes data on real consumption
balances, the personal consumption expenditures deﬂator, and the Federal funds rate (with the
variables transformed in logarithms and multiplied by 100, where appropriate). Since the series on
the unused portions only begins in 1990, I ﬁrst estimate a ﬁve-variable speciﬁcation that includes the
nonrevolving and revolving loan components from 1984 through the ﬁrst quarter of 2007 (analogous
to the monthly results displayed in Figure 3). Then I estimate including the unused portions from
1990 through the ﬁrst quarter of 2007 including only the credit card loans. Lastly I include the
nonrevolving loans in the speciﬁcation. Similar to section 3, Figures 5 through 7 display the
impulse response functions calculated from the linear projection method along with standard error
bands.28
Figure 5 displays the impulse response functions for quarterly nonrevolving installment and
credit card loans. The quarterly impulse response functions are similar to their monthly coun-
terparts displayed in Figure 3 for the same post-1984 sample. The quarterly functions are more
16muted, though both loan components show a similar pattern–an anemic to zero response for ap-
proximately two years after the shock followed by a decline (while the for the monthly impulse
response functions both loan components increase for about two years, then decline thereafter).
At least by the metric of judging the lending channel by comparing the consumer loan compo-
nents, the quarterly does not dispel the general ﬁnding from the monthly data that after 1984 the
loan-supply eﬀect is weak or not evident.
Figure 6 displays the impulse response functions for credit card loans and the unused portions.
For this speciﬁcation the response of credit card loans is noticeably positive (relative to the more
anemic response in Figure 5), increasing for up to a year after a shock. The conditional standard
errors support the statistical signiﬁcance of the function (less so the unconditional traditional
standard errors). The unused portions do not decline in response to the contractionary shock,
but instead are positive for the length of the horizon (with statistically signiﬁcant conditional and
unconditional standard errors).
Figure 7 displays the impulse response functions with the nonrevolving component, credit card
loans and unused portions. The unused portions show a smaller increase following the shock, while
the consumer loan components show similar pattern to those displayed in Figure 5. The function
for nonrevolving loans shows a small negative response in this case but is not statistically diﬀerent
from zero for most of the horizon. The function for credit card loans is similar to its counter part
in Figure 5, though with the negative decline beginning earlier in Figure 7.
Given the responses for both credit card balances and for nonrevolving consumer loans, there
does not appear to be a substitution into credit card loans. And relative to the data on the unused
portions, the decline in credit card balances does is not matched by a reduction in the supply of
credit. Hence, on balance the quarterly data set provides corroborative evidence with respect to
the inference drawn from section 3.
Why we see an increase in the unused portions in response to an increase in the Federal funds
rate is uncertain. The response may reﬂect that the limit remains relatively unchanged while the
balances decline. In Figure 6, this would only make sense, however, later in the horizon when
17balances actually decline. One explanation may be that this aggregate response reﬂects lenders
shifting their credit card portfolios towards more credit-worthy borrowers while contracting the
limits or accounts of more marginal borrowers. This may lead to a net increase in unused portions
even as borrowers increase the demand for balances (if, for example, more qualiﬁed card holders
receive larger increases in their limits, ceteris paribus, than the decline in the limit for the marginal
borrower).29 This is merely conjecture at this point, but such a distributional eﬀect at the level of
the limit among credit card holders may be an interesting area for additional research to consider.
3.4 Quarterly Consumer Lending and Bank Size
While the unused portions data oﬀer a new perspective on the lending channel, the quarterly Call
Report data are exploited to examine the lending channel hypothesis that the loan-supply eﬀect
should be more evident for small banks (as noted in Section 2). Large bank lending should be
less-aﬀected by a policy shock that small lenders (where large banking institutions are able to
insulate their balance sheets from a policy shock–see Kashyap and Stein (2000) for discussion).
We consider that hypothesis here in the context of consumer lending.
Figure 8 displays the results for both large banks and small banks (for both the nonrevolving and
revolving loan categories) since the fourth quarter of 1972 through the ﬁrst quarter of 2007. Bank
size is deﬁned by the Call Report variable “total assets.” Large banks are deﬁned as all banks at
and above the 95th percentile while small banks include all banks below the 95th percentile (in line
with the deﬁnition used by Kashyap and Stein (2000)).30 For the 1972 to 2007 sample, the relative
responses of small and large bank lending are suggestive of the lending channel (and consistent
with Kashyap and Stein’s (2000) ﬁnding). Both types of loans from small bank decline following
the shock, while large bank nonrevolving and revolving loans (credit card loans) show essentially a
zero response, if not positive, for up to eight quarters after the shock.
For the 1972 through 1983 sample, the relative responses are similar to the long sample (though
the sample size is small for the pre-1984 sample). After 1984, the evidence for the lending channel
is less compelling. Most notably, while the large bank loan categories respond similarly as in
18the full sample, the impulse responses for small bank nonrevolving and revolving loans are positive
(though only the nonrevolving function is statistically signiﬁcant for a notable length of time). This
positive response is consistent with the overall results found with the monthly data displayed in
Figure 3 (note that in Figure 5 the impulse response function for nonrevolving loans from large and
small banks combined is essentially a muted version of function for large banks in Figure 8–oﬀset
slightly by small banks, which make up a small share of consumer lending as discussed in Section
2).31
Overall, while the loan-supply eﬀect for small bank lending appears evident in the overall sample
(and the early sample), this eﬀect is not evident in the latter part of the sample. Moreover, the
general implications from the data for small bank and large bank lending are consistent with the
monthly data and other quarterly analysis discussed earlier in the paper.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Though the lending channel has proved to be an interesting area of research, the ﬁndings of this
paper suggest that consumer lending data is no longer consistent with a loan-supply eﬀect. At ﬁrst
glance households and consumer lending seem to ﬁt well with the assumptions driving the lending
channel, especially when a long-term perspective is considered. Given the growth of consumer
credit over the last two decades, the economic signiﬁcance of the channel may be greater than
in the past. Upon closer inspection, however, disaggregated consumer credit data across bank
size, across revolving and nonrevolving consumer loans, across bank and non-bank lenders, and
ﬁnally, across time, reveal the assumptions of the lending channel for consumer lending are not
substantiated in the data after 1983. In other words, monetary policy does not appear to have
any real eﬀect on consumer lending, at least through the bank lending channel.
The ﬁndings of this paper raise important issues with respect to consumer behavior in general
and with respect to the monetary transmission mechanism. On consumer behavior in general,
economists certainly have linked developments in consumer credit and the importance of liquidity-
19constraints for households. In addition to Gross and Souleles (2002), Attanasio et al. (2004)
and Wakabayashi and Horioka (2005) both provide recent evidence of liquidity constraints with
data on consumer durables and Japanese household data, respectively (see also Zinman (2003) and
Telyukova (2006)). The evidence in this paper, however, suggests that in the aggregate liquidity
constraints for households are not economically signiﬁc a n t – a tl e a s tn o tt oad e g r e et om o t i v a t e
the lending channel. The positive impulse responses of credit card loans after 1983, in particular,
may be indicative of this liquidity.
Finally, while greater credit access may have weakened the lending channel, this same ease may
suggest additional implications for the monetary transmission mechanism. Monetary policy may
still force a household’s hand by aﬀecting the cost of consumer debt and thus strengthening the
balance sheet channel. That is, an increase in the Federal Funds rate may have more economic
signiﬁcance for households holding more expensive revolving debt. With a greater number of
households ﬁtting that description, this may aﬀect the accelerator aﬀect discussed by Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1996). Also, the relative behavior of bank and non-bank sources of consumer
credit documented in this paper suggest additional topics to explore, such as the eﬀect of a monetary
policy shock on non-bank lenders, or the relevance of small banks in the transmission mechanism
at all (given their diminished share of consumer lending). Such possibilities may be interesting
areas for further research.
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Notes 1Den Haan, Sumner and Yamashiro’s (2007) paper conﬁrms and updates the ﬁndings for consumer lending from
earlier lending channel research, including Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Ludvigson (1998). Note, too, this paper
leaves the implications of Den Haan, Sumner and Yamashiro’s (2007) ﬁnding for real estate loans for other research.
2The monthly data set is from the Federal Reserve Board’s G.19 release and is discussed further in sections 2 and
3.
3This follows Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) and Gerter and Gilchrist (1993, 1994). The former exploit the
distinction between small and large banks and the latter focus on small and large ﬁrms to identify the lending
eﬀect. Also, Ashcraft (2006) focuses on holding company aﬃliation, while, Den Haan, Sumner and Yamashiro (2006)
compare the behavior of commercial and industrial loans to real estate and consumer loans to discern the lending
eﬀect.
4One might also estimate with alternative identiﬁcation schemes, such as employing long-run restrictions (see
Favero (2001)). This paper, however, is not meant to be a referendum on the methodology, but to consider new data
within that methodology.
245Den Haan, Sumner and Yamashiro (2007) provide a cogent discussion on the diﬀerence between the two sources–
the G.19 data release and the Call Reports–as well as the usefulness in using both data sets for making robust
inference.
6Some point to the increase in credit card use as indicative of liquidity constraints (see Gross and Souleles (2002)).
The 2004 Survey of Consumer Finance, for example, reveals that 74 percent of households have a credit card and
approximately 50 percent of those carry a balance on their primary credit card from month to month. Also, the
mean balance increased from $2,800 in 1989 to approximately $5,100 by 2004 (in 2004 dollars). See section 2 for
further discussion.
7See also, Campbell (2005) and Ramey and Vine (2005) for further discussion and analysis of the “Great Modera-
tion.” See Ahmed et al. (2002) for a summary of possible explanations. Dynan et al. (2006), for example, emphasize
ﬁnancial innovations in explaining the moderation.
8Based on author’s calculations from the data set described in section 4 (the Call Reports of all commercial banks).
All ﬁgures are in 2000 dollars and seasonally adjusted.
9Consumer credit series are available from the Federal Reserve Board, statistical release H.19. Series are seasonally
adjusted and deﬂated using the personal consumption expenditures deﬂator (2000 = 100). Revolving credit includes
bank card type credit cards, department store cards, and American Express and Discover cards.
10The non-bank component includes ﬁnance companies and nonﬁnancial business. These categories include de-
partment store credit and ﬁnancing companies associated with auto dealerships, to name two examples. The Federal
Reserve Board’s G.19 release also includes data on credit unions, savings and loans, and even student loans. However,
in this paper I focus on the dominant sources of non-bank ﬁnance from direct lenders (or once dominant, in the case
of nonﬁnancial business).
11These series are generally highly correlated over time, as one might expect, though the correlations change a bit
over time. For the monthly data, nonrevolving and revovling bank credit have a correlation coeﬃcient close to 0.8,
but this declines to 0.59 after 1984. After 1984, nonrevolving bank credit is correlated with non-bank nonrevolving
credit at 0.70, though is only correlated with non-bank revolving credit at 0.20. Revolving credit from the two
sources are highly correlated at 0.88.
12For the bank classes, nonrevolving lending from small banks is negatively correlated with large bank nonrevolving
lending with a correlation of −0.89. Large and small bank revolving credit, however, are positively correlated at
0.50. Also, large bank nonrevolving and revolving credit are positively correlated at 0.97, though small bank revolving
credit is negatively correlated with small bank nonrevolving credit at −0.46.
13This, of course, is a conjecture based on the observed credit card data. Building a model of bank behavior in
the context of the lending channel is not the objective of this paper. Stein (1998) provides such an exposition. In
terms of credit card lines, one can refer to Castronova and Hagstrom (2004). In the context of the transmission
25mechanism, modeling the demand and supply of credit card lines is certainly worthy of continued research, a point
which is touched on in the conclusion of this paper.
14This information is taken from the FDIC’s “Graph Book” available at http://www2.fdic.gov/QBP/Index.asp. In
particular, see the FDIC’s Graph Book tables, “Expansion of Commerical Bank Credit Card Lines” and “Utilization
Rates of Loan Commitments.”
15For a diﬀerent perspective, the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) reveals that credit card use is distributed
across income, age and education level; that average balances increase with income and education and are highest for
households with a head aged 35 to 54; and that since 1989, average balances have increased along all demographic
delineations.
16Again, the data on consumer credit is from the Federal Reserve Board’s G.19 release, which includes disaggregated
data across bank and non-bank sources. Data on consumption and the deﬂator are available from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis while the series for the federal funds rate is available from the Federal Reserve Board.
17It is common practice to include a price index for commodities in the VAR. Doing so had been found to solve the
“price puzzle” common to this analysis–the increase in the regular price index following an increase in the federal
funds rate. However, similar to Den Haan et al. (2007), I found that for more recent data the inclusion of this
variable makes little diﬀerence for the results. In the interest of parsimony, I leave that variable out of the VAR.
18Extending the sample back to 1959 with only the nonrevolving component does not change the estimated impulse
response functions discussed for the samples beginning in 1968 to any noticable degree.
19I also compared the results considering diﬀerent break dates (for example, beginning with Greenspan’s tenure)
and across decades. The qualitative results did not change by any degree of note. Hence, here I only report the
results with the break separating the broad periods.
20Note that the results discussed in this section are robust if real disposable income is used in place of consumption
(as in Den Haan, Sumner and Yamashiro (2007)) or nonfarm pay r o l le m p l o y m e n ti si n c l u d e d . N o t e ,t o o ,t h er e s u l t s
are robust to using a block recursive structure. The results are also robust to the inclusion of a time trend, to
additional lag lengths (2, 6, 8 and 12 lags were also considered) and to ordering the federal funds rate ahead of
the other variables. These variations did not change the impulse response functions to a notable degree so are
not reported here. The interested reader can see the author’s website for ﬁgures displaying the impulse response
functions calculated under these alternative speciﬁcations.
21Jordà (2007) also provides a joint test of the impulse response function coeﬃcients, and a test of the cumulative
signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients. These additional metrics did not add much to the inference in this paper, nor facilitate
the comparison of the results to previous lending channel research. A previous version of this paper includes these
metrics and can be found on the author’s website.
22However, for thorough comparison, the impulse response functions calculated from the VAR can be found on the
26author’s website.
23Replication of Den Haan, Sumner and Yamashiro’s (2007) was performed though is not reported here. Specif-
ically, I calculated the responses of the system variables to both a monetary and non-monetary shock as deﬁned
by Den Haan et al. (2007). I thank Steven Sumner for the code to carry out this estimation. Figures for the
responses of the consumer credit series to the monetary shock relative to shocks to consumption expenditures and
real disposable income (separately) are available on the author’s website.
24One will also note the weak response of consumption in Figure 3b. One possibility for the diﬀerence in results
before and after 1983 is a diﬀerence in the size of the shock. However, the inference is not changed if an identical
one percent shock of the federal funds rate is applied to each sample period. Results with the one percent shock can
be found on the author’s website.
25The results are similar if bank and non-bank loan components are estimated jointly in a seven-variable speciﬁca-
tion (see Figure 5 in the working paper version on the author’s website).
26While the data are not consistent with the traditional lending channel assumptions, the decline in nonbank
nonrevovling credit (while commercial bank lending is positive) raises questions on the evolution of the monetary
transmission mechanism. How a policy shock aﬀects non-bank lenders relative to bank lenders may be an interesting
area of further inquiry, which we leave for further research.
27For example, borrowers might seek a lower limit out of preference for a stable ratio between balances and the
limit. Evidence of this sort of preference has been documented by Gross and Souleles (2002) and Castranova and
Hagstrom (2004).
28The corrected-AIC chose lag lengths of two for the estimation reported here. The results are robust to a lag
lengths of one and generally a length of three, though at higher lag lengths the degrees of freedom with the quarterly
data (on the shorter samples) becomes an issue. The results are also robust to including real GDP instead of
consumption.
29That may be the case since the institutional rules governing limit extentions certainly favor long-term card holders
with a good credit history and so forth (see Gross and Souleles (2002)).
30The Call Report data is available on the FDIC’s “Statistics on Depository Institutions” website by quarter back
to 2001. All other quarters back to the fourth quarter of 1972 are availalbe in .csv format by request from the FDIC.
31Given the sample sizes with the quarterly data, we estimate for each bank class separately (as displayed in Figure
8). If we include all four loan categories together in one speciﬁcation, the results are less-supportive of the lending
channel for the 1972 to 2007 and pre-1984 samples (though the estimation suﬀers from less degrees of freedom with
seven varariables in the speciﬁcation).
27Figure 1: Commercial Bank and Non-Bank Consumer Credit Loans
Notes:  Monthly consumer credit series for the top two panels are from the Federal Reserve Board's G.19 release. The data has 
been deflated using the personal consumption expenditures deflator (Bureau of Economic Analysis) and seasonally adjusted.  
Quarterly data for the bank classes are from the FDIC (large banks at or above the 95th percentile in total assets; small below the 
95th).  The non-bank component includes finance companies and nonfinancial business. 
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Notes: See notes to Figure 3.  Non-Bank includes finance companies and non-financial business.  Total consumer credit includes in addition to banks, 
finance companies and non-financial business, savings and loans, credit unions and other sources listed in the Federal Reserve Board's G.19 release. 
1984 through 2006
Figure 4:  Impulse Response Functions of monthly Non-Bank consumer credit to a shock to the Federal 
funds rate
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Notes: See notes to Figure 3.  Quarterly data collected from the FDIC.  The data are seasonally adjusted and expressed in constant 2000 dollars.
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Notes: See notes to Figure 3.  Data on the unused portions of credit card lines and credit card balances were collected from the FDIC, the latter series being first reported in the Call Reports in 1990.  The data are seasonally 
adjusted and expressed in constant dollars. 
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Figure 7:  Impulse Response Functions in response to a shock to the Federal funds rate: 1990 to 2007 (Quarterly) all Consumer loans and unused portions 
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Figure 8:  Impulse Response Functions in response to a shock to the Federal funds rate: Large and Small Banks from 1972 through 2007
1972 through 2007: Small Banks (Below the 95th percentile in total assets)
1972 through 2007: Large Banks (95th percentile in total assets and above)
1972 through 1983: Large Banks (95th percentile in total assets and above)
forecast horizon (quarters)
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